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THE PLUMPY’NUT PREDICAMENT: IS COMPULSORY LICENSING 
A SOLUTION? 
 





Ready-to-use therapeutic foods (RUTFs) are nutritional products that are high in 
energy and protein and are enhanced with vitamins and minerals designed specifically to 
treat different forms of malnutrition.1 RUTFs have several known applications, however, 
chief amongst them is the use of RUTFs to treat malnutrition in children or to supplement 
the diets of elderly patients with special nutritional requirements.2 RUTFs can be made 
with a mixture of different proteins, carbohydrates, and fats and can potentially be 
manufactured without using water, which prevents spoilage.3 Shelf longevity and the 
ability to consume without cooking provide the key benefits of RUTFs.4 
 
Over the past twenty years, RUTFs have become increasingly important in the 
global hunger context.5 The United Nations (UN) estimates that almost one-third of 
children in developing countries are malnourished, with malnourishment causing over 
40% of the eleven million yearly deaths of children under the age of five in these 
countries.6 Malnourishment is defined as a state of being poorly nourished and is a result 
of insufficient caloric intake combined with a deficiency of protein and nutrients.7 Of 
particular geographic interest is Sub-Saharan Africa, where more than 42% of children 
suffer from moderate to severe malnourishment, with this number projected to increase to 
over 50% by 2025.8 The effect on children in Sub-Saharan Africa is amplified by low 
government effectiveness, violent conflicts, and rampant poverty. 9  However, 
                                                
∗* I would like to thank the Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property Editors for their help and 
Professor Chris Seaman for his invaluable contributions and assistance with this Article. And, of course, 
many thanks to my parents, Mr. Sheikh Rahim and Mrs. Noorussabah Bakhsh for their never-ending 
support and love. 
1 Steve Collins, Community Therapeutic Care: A New Approach to Managing Acute Malnutrition in 
Emergencies and Beyond, Food and Nutritional Technical Assistance, Technical Note No. 8, June 2004. 
2 S. Isanaka, Effect of preventive supplementation with ready-to-use-therapeutic food on the nutritional 
status, mortality and morbidity of children 6 to 60 months in Niger: a cluster randomized trial, J. AM. MED. 
ASSOC., Jan. 21, 2009; 301(3): 277–285. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Doctors Without Borders, DWB Calls for Increased Use of Nutrient Dense RUTF to Save Malnourished 
Children’s Lives, Oct. 10, 2007, available at http://www.worldhunger.org/ articles/07/global/doctors.htm. 
6 World Hunger Education Service, 2011 World Hunger and Poverty Facts and Statistics, available at 
http://www.worldhunger.org/articles/Learn/world%20hunger%20facts% 202002.htm. 
7  UNICEF, Malnutrition: The Big Picture, available at http://www.unicef.org/nutrition/ 
index_bigpicture.html 
8 UNICEF, Fighting Malnutrition to Save Lives, available at http://www.unicefusa.org/work/ nutrition/. 
9 Id. 
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malnourishment is a condition that can consistently be treated successfully by an 
adequate diet for a period of approximately six months.10 RUTFs satisfy the nutritional 
requirements for a diet adequate to combat malnutrition and as such, are an essential tool 
against global hunger.11 
 
Plumpy’Nut is a RUTF that was developed by French pediatrician Andre Briend 
in 1996. 12  At the time, Briend was working for Institut de Recherche pour le 
Développement, a research institute that was collaborating with another French 
corporation, Nutriset, on a project to develop a commercially viable treatment 
specifically for malnutrition.13 After several failed trials, Plumpy’Nut was developed 
using a blend of peanut butter, powdered milk, sugar, and oil and is fortified with 
vitamins and minerals.14  
 
Over the past five years, Plumpy’Nut has transformed the treatment of 
malnourishment.15 Plumpy’Nut quickly developed a reputation as a cure to malnutrition 
during the 2005 food crisis in Niger.16 This food crisis was the first time Plumpy’Nut was 
mass distributed as a solution to malnutrition.17 It was during this first distribution that 
Plumpy’Nut garnered excellent reviews and rocketed to worldwide popularity, with non-
profit organizations labeling the RUTF a “wonder product,” “silver bullet,” and “life 
saver.”18 Since then, Plumpy’Nut has maintained approximately 90% of the market share 
of RUTFs.19 Among the novel characteristics of Plumpy’Nut that make it the RUTF of 
choice for the UN and the World Health Organization (WHO) are that, unlike other 
RUTFs, there is no need to mix the product with water before consumption, and it is also 
the first RUTF with a solid texture.20 Additionally, Plumpy’Nut can be consumed without 
supervision of a physician, which allows home treatment of malnutrition, easing the 
backlog on overburdened local hospitals.21 Most importantly, Plumpy’Nut has a good 
taste, making it desirable to children.22  
 
                                                
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12  Nutriset, Plumpy’Nut, available at http://www.nutriset.fr/en/product-range/produit-par-
produit/plumpynut-ready-to-use-therapeutic-food-rutf.html. 










21 Id. (stating "In 2002 it took 2,000 staff to treat 10,000 children during a famine in Angola. In Niger we 
needed just 150 staff for the same number of patients. Thanks to Plumpy’Nut, mass treatment is suddenly 
possible."). 
22 Id. 
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After the formula for Plumpy’Nut was developed, Nutriset immediately pursued 
patent protection in France.23 Since 1997, Plumpy’Nut has been patented in thirty-eight 
countries, including much of Africa. 24  Nutriset has also aggressively protected its 
intellectual property, and because of this, the private company has been able to place a 
stranglehold on the RUTF market.25 However, Nutriset has been unable to manufacture 
enough Plumpy’Nut to satisfy its growing demand from non-profit organizations and 
initially refused to license others to use the technology.26 Nutriset currently possesses 
neither the production capacity nor the resources to expand production capacity to fill 
current standing orders of Plumpy’Nut.27 Instead, the company has focused on its 
franchising system or else resorted to licensing strictly in countries where there is no 
patent protection or locations where the raw material costs make mass production 
impractical.28 As a result, some children who suffer from malnutrition are unable to 
receive Plumpy’Nut in a timely fashion, and non-profit organizations that want to order 
additional quantities are limited by Nutriset’s production capabilities.29 Finally, Nutriset 
has also taken legal action to prevent other non-profit organizations from manufacturing, 
transporting, or even storing similar and cheaper RUTFs, despite the strong international 
demand.30 
 
This Article suggests that in certain legislatively defined humanitarian instances, 
the United States government should issue compulsory licenses for patented technology 
in order to benefit non-domestic populations that may otherwise be disastrously affected. 
Specifically, by reapplying currently used principles from pharmaceutical and 
agricultural patents to food-related patents, and by implementing a novel compensation 
scheme, issues in which a patentee is unable or unwilling to license a patent can be 
compelled to do so while still benefitting from their patented technology. Legislation of 
this kind would still fall within the guidelines of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS) agreement, of which the U.S. is a signatory. Part II of this article 
investigates compulsory licenses in intellectual property generally, as well as antitrust 
provisions relevant to compulsory licensing. Part III discusses the merits of the 
Plumpy’Nut patent protection and antitrust concerns. Part IV explains compulsory 
licensing under TRIPS and its subsequent effects on intellectual property. Finally, Part V 
                                                
23  Andrew Rice, The Peanut Solution, (2 September 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/05/magazine/05Plumpy-t.html?pagewanted=all. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. (stating Nutriset has taken legal action even in states where there has not been manufacture, rather 
only storage or transit, even when there is no patent in the export or destination state, preventing the 
buildup of any reserve supply). 
26 Sasha S. Rao, Improving Access to Patented Humanitarian Products Via TRIPS: A Study of the 
Plumpy'Nut Problem, 15 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 111, 113-114 (2010) (stating Plumpy’Nut can be 
manufactured locally due to its simple process and use of raw materials that are available in most 
developing counties. The principal cost is the raw materials themselves. Nutriset has franchised some 
manufacturers to produce Plumpy’Nut. The output from these facilities is for situations or orders that 
require less than 50 tons of Plumpy’Nut annually. However, the franchisee must buy the vitamins, 
minerals, and additives directly from Nutriset.). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 114. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 115. 
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argues for reapplication of certain compulsory patent licensing guidelines to food patents, 
under certain circumstances. 
 
 
I.  LICENSING IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
 
Licenses are commonplace in intellectual property and are simply contracts 
between the owner of the intellectual property, who becomes the licensor, and a second 
party, the licensee.31 License agreements have varying scope and each party is free to 
negotiate the terms of the contractual agreement.32 A license, however, cannot grant 
rights exceeding the rights of the intellectual property owner; a party cannot license more 
rights than it possesses.33 Generally speaking, in U.S. patent and copyright law, the owner 
of intellectual property has an exclusive right to their intellectual property and maintains 
complete control over any licensing.34 However, in some instances, the U.S. government 
has granted compulsory, or statutory, licenses.35 A compulsory license is an involuntary 
contract between a willing licensee and an unwilling licensor.36 These licenses are used in 
copyright and patent law.37 At times, this compulsory license is mandated due to antitrust 
law and regulations.38 
 
A. Compulsory Licensing in Copyright Law 
 
Compulsory licenses in copyright law allow a party to use a copyrighted work 
without the permission of the copyright owner.39 Use of the copyrighted work is 
regulated by the U.S. Copyright Act and is subject to a standardized royalty.40 A 
compulsory license in copyright law grants the licensee only the right to use the 
copyrighted material, not to distribute or reproduce it.41 
 
In creating a compulsory license scheme in federal copyright law, the U.S. 
Congress aimed to balance the interests of authors, distributors, and the general public.42 
Additionally, the implementation of compulsory licenses has allowed the law to keep 
pace with technology.43 There are three primary public policy reasons for compulsory 
licenses in copyright law: 1) to assist public dissemination and author compensation; 2) 
                                                
31 Mixing Equipment Co. v. Innova-Tech, Inc., 228 U.S.PQ.. 221, 224 (E.D.Pa.1985). 
32 Peter Maybarduk, Compulsory Licenses: A Tool to Improve Global Access to the HPV Vaccine? 35 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 323, 325 (2009). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 




39 Jethro Dean, Would You Like to Play Again? Saving Classic Video Games From Virtual Extinction 
Through Statutory Licensing, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 405, 419 (2006). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Jason Rooks, Constitutionality of Judicially Imposed Compulsory Licenses in Copyright Infringement 
Cases, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 255, 258 (1995). 
43 Id. 
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to avoid past market failure; and 3) to reduce free riding.44 Compulsory licensing 
eliminates the need for individual licensing between the copyright owner and an 
interested licensee and facilitates timely distribution of a copyrighted work, while 
ensuring that the author is compensated in some manner.45 Before compulsory licensing, 
the market allowed owners and licensees to contract with each other; however, this 
system proved unstable and led to situations in which parties were licensing identical 
works at different costs, and copyright enforceability became difficult due to inconsistent 
judicial determinations.46 Finally, with modern technology, free riding has made it 
difficult to enforce copyright protection because copyrighted works can be distributed 
quickly over the internet.47 Compulsory licenses assist in this regard by ensuring that the 
required license fee encourages users to obtain the compulsory license rather than 
infringe the copyright, thereby reducing free riding.48 
 
B. Compulsory Licensing in Patent Law 
 
Patents are generally the strongest form of intellectual property protection.49 The 
principal goals of the United States patent system are to encourage innovation, urge 
disclosure, and promote manufacture.50 In exchange for disclosing an invention that is 
useful, novel, and non-obvious, the patentee is granted a limited exclusive right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention for a period 
of twenty years from the date of filing.51 An inventor may commercialize the invention or 
may choose not to, but can prevent others from using any part of the technology.52 
Essentially, a patent is a limited term monopoly that rewards an inventor for their 
innovation.53 
 
Accordingly, compulsory licensing has found little support in patent law, other 
than as a remedy to an antitrust violation.54 Any form of compulsory licensing is thought 
to negatively affect the policy goals of patent law by reducing security in the investment 
in developing new technology and subsequently obtaining patent protection and also by 
reducing the incentive to innovate, particularly in a field where compulsory licensing is 
an option.55 Rather than developing new technology independently, a party could wait 
until someone else developed it, and then, if the invention was commercially successful, 




47 Id. at 269-270. 
48 Id. 
49 See Kurt Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology 
Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 426 (2002). 
50 Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA 
349, 357 (1993). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 See Saunders, supra note 49, at 426. 
54 Id. at 430-431. 
55 Id. 
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the party could obtain a compulsory license and enter the market without investing in the 
research.56 
 
However, patent protection is not unlimited.57 For example, patents reading on 
standards-essential technology and patents owned by members of standards-setting 
organizations are generally subject to licensing at reasonable and non-discriminatory 
(RAND) terms, in order to facilitate the design of compatible products and 
interoperability of devices manufactured by different manufacturers. 58  Additionally, 
compulsory licensing in the patent context has been addressed by the United States 
legislature.59 In 28 U.S.C. 1498(a), the U.S. government is given the authority to use, or 
to authorize a third party to use, any issued U.S. patent.60 In exchange for this unlicensed 
use, the patentee is entitled to just compensation.61 
 
The U.S. government has taken advantage of this statute on different occasions.62 
In the Clean Air Act, the government utilized this authority by permitting compulsory 
licensing whenever the Attorney General finds that an otherwise unavailable patent is 
needed to accomplish the goals of the Act, and there is no reasonable alternative.63 
Similarly, the Atomic Energy Act allows compulsory licensing if the license would be in 
the interest of the public.64 Other instances include the Plant Protection Act and the Bayh-
Dole Act, which respectively allow compulsory licensing when it is necessary to ensure 
an adequate supply of food or when the technology is the result of federally funded 
research.65 However, the provisions of these Acts have been interpreted narrowly, 
indicating a policy avoiding the use of compulsory licensing whenever possible.66 
 
C. Antitrust Law and Patents 
 
Antitrust law aims to encourage competition, improve economic efficiency, and 
limit activity interfering with the normal effects of supply and demand in the free 
market.67 There is an inherent tension between patent law and antitrust law; while one 
grants a temporary monopoly and can potentially confer monopoly power on the 
patentee, the other seeks to eliminate monopolies.68 However, the interplay between a 
patent and monopoly power is not an automatic process.69 Likewise, a monopoly is not an 
                                                
56 Id. (referring to this behavior as the “wait and see approach”). 
57 George Tsai, Canada's Access to Medicines Regime: Lessons for the Compulsory Licensing Schemes 
Under the WTO Doha Declaration, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 1063, 1063 (2009). 
58 See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
1889, 1896 (2002). 
59 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §1498. (2011) 
60 Julian-Arnold, supra note 50, at 352. 
61 See Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
62 Saunders, supra note 49 at 435. 
63 42 U.S.C. §7608 (1994). 
64 Id. §2138(a) (1999). 
65 Saunders, supra note 49, at 446.  
66 Id. 
67 Arnold Calmann, Understanding the Intellectual Property License, 915 PLI/Pat 449, 465 (2007). 
68 Saunders, supra note 49 at 431. 
69 Id. 
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automatic violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a provision that regulates 
monopolies in antitrust law.70 
 
The key difference in a monopoly created by a patent compared to a monopoly in 
the antitrust context is that patented technologies may compete with each other, thereby 
constraining monopoly pricing. 71  In other words, a patented technology can be 
substitutable.72 Therefore, a patent only confers monopoly power on the patentee in the 
antitrust sense when there are no substitutes for the patented product.73 As a result, when 
a patentee refuses to license a patent, this behavior is anticompetitive only when it creates 
or extends monopoly power in the relevant marketplace.74 
 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act regulates monopolization.75 In order to violate the 
statute, a party must have monopoly power in the relevant market and must also exhibit 
monopoly conduct.76 A critical step in determining whether a Section 2 violation has 
occurred is determining what the relevant market is.77 Courts have used factors such as 
the substitutability of the product or supplier as well as the geographical market.78 
Monopoly power has been generally defined as 75% of market share in the relevant 
market, although this is considered on a sliding scale when there are significant barriers 
to enter the market.79 Finally, monopoly conduct is fact specific and guided by case 
law.80 
 
II.  THE PLUMPY’NUT PATENT 
 
There are three primary types of patents: utility, design, and plant.81 Patents on 
foods fall under the utility category, as utility patents cover processes, machines, articles 
of manufacture, or compositions of matter.82 In order to be patentable, foods still need to 
meet the normal requirements of patentability.83 This creates an additional hurdle for 
culinary patents, as utility patents are not generally granted for simple recipes; rather, to 
obtain a patent a food must be new and non-obvious in view of other recipes.84 However, 
if a food meets these requirements, it is patentable under U.S. patent law.85 
                                                
70 Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 401 
(2003). 
71 Saunders, supra note 49, at 431-432. 
72 See id. 
73 Id. at 431. 
74 35 U.S.C. §271(d)(4) (1994) (rationale for this rule lies in the belief that the primary social utility of a 
patent is in the disclosure of an invention rather than commercialization). 
75 15 U.S.C §2 (1890). 
76 Feldman, supra note 70 at 401.  
77 See, e.g., Image Tech. Servs. V. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. 
81 Emily Cunningham, Protecting Cuisine Under the Rubric of Intellectual Property: Should the Law Play 
a Bigger Role in the Kitchen?, 9 J. HIGH TECH. L. 21, 23 (2009). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 25. 
85 Id. 




Plumpy’Nut has been patented in the United States.86 The ‘284 patent contains a 
single independent claim directed to a 
complete food or nutritional supplement which contains at most 10% by weight 
of water, develops an osmolality of less than 100 mOsm/kg after immersion in 
four times its own volume of water and is stable to oxidation, comprising a 
mixture of food-grade products, said mixture being coated with at least one lipid-
rich substance derived from oleaginous seeds and being enriched in vitamins, 
soluble or insoluble mineral salts, enzymes or mixtures thereof.87 
 
The patent has been criticized as being potentially invalid because it seems overly broad 
as well as obvious in light of prior recipes.88 Critics of the Plumpy’Nut patent argue that 
it covers essentially any nut-based RUTF paste and is thus impossible to design around, 
while others argue that the patent has essentially conferred monopoly power on Nutriset 
and thus violated the Sherman Act.89  
 
A. Should the ‘284 Patent Be Held Invalid? 
 
Two non-profit organizations, Mama Cares Foundation and Breedlove Foods, Inc. 
have unsuccessfully attempted to bring legal action against the ‘284 patent for 
invalidity.90 The primary argument for invalidity in this instance is that the single 
independent claim in the ‘284 patent is overly broad.91 While broad claims are patentable, 
these claims are susceptible to challenge on novelty grounds.92 The relevant statutes of 
the Patent Act are Sections 102 and 103.93 Section 102 prevents patenting an invention 
that already exists or is described in prior art, and Section 103 prohibits patenting a claim 
that would be obvious, in light of prior disclosures, to someone having ordinary skill in 
the art.94 Courts have employed a four factor test in determining non-obviousness: 1) the 
scope and content of the prior art; 2) the differences between the current claim and the 
prior art; 3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and 4) any other objective evidence of 
non-obviousness.95  
 
                                                
86 U.S. Patent No. 6,346,284. 
87 Id. 
88 Rice, supra note 23, (2 Sept. 2010). 
89 Id. 
90 Rao, supra note 26, at 114 (arguing that due to procedural difficulties and the risk of being counter sued 
for patent infringement, the organizations are headed towards an unsuccessful legal battle and have pursued 
other options, such as developing an open source formula).  
91 Id. (stating the broad scope impacts the cost, quality, and security of the supply chain for RUTFs. Patent 
allows Nutriset to essentially limit the number of providers, and also precludes aid organizations from 
finding similar products that may be cheaper, in greater reserve, or of better quality.) 
92 Cunningham, supra note 81, at 23. 
93 Rao, supra note 26 at 119-120. 
94 Sandra Schmeider, Scope of Biotechnology Inventions in the United States and in Europe - Compulsory 
Licensing, Experimental Use and Arbitration: A Study of Patentability of DNA-Related Inventions with 
Special Emphasis on the Establishment of an Arbitration Based Compulsory Licensing System, 21 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 163, 183 (2004). 
95 Rao, supra note 26, at 120. 
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Section 102 does not apply to the instant case because there is no prior art 
describing the specific formula of Plumpy’Nut.96 The four factors used to determine 
obviousness in Section 103, however, have stronger applicability.97 The scope and 
content of prior art will be large and voluminous, including all prior RUTFs designed to 
treat malnourishment.98 The differences between the claim here and the prior art are 
slightly more difficult to distinguish.99 The claim is specific in defining a composition of 
acceptable products, yet it is broad in that it allows use of any oleaginous seed and all 
vitamins.100 This differentiates the claim from the prior art by proportion and composition 
of nutrients, and potentially by whether the product is in liquid or solid form.101 Because 
of this, it is likely that it will be unique when compared in totality to the prior art.102 The 
ordinary skill in the art is presumably low, as the product uses common household 
materials and staple ingredients, and can be made in a household kitchen.103 However, 
considering the objective factors of non-obviousness, the commercial success that 
Plumpy’Nut has enjoyed indicates that the claim is not obvious.104 The commercial 
success, combined with the initial perception of the inventors regarding the product’s 
potential commercial success, weighs strongly against holding the claim obvious.105 
 
Courts have discussed the weight of each of the four factors in analyzing Section 
103.106 Following through the analysis, it would be up to a court to decide if the 
commercial success and potential differences between the current claim and the prior art 
outweigh what someone skilled in the art would have considered obvious, given the prior 
art.107 However, a finding of invalidity may not solve the problem entirely.108 If the 
patent were held invalid, this would only impact the U.S. patent.109 To get the same result 
worldwide, legal action would have to be taken in each of the thirty-eight countries the 
patent is granted in to accommodate for shipping and transport of the product.110 This 
presents a sizeable legal undertaking and would require significant resources, time, and 






                                                
96 See id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 See id. 





105 See id. 
106 See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
107 See Rao, supra note 26, at 121. 
108 See id. at 124. 
109 See id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
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B. Has the ‘284 Patent Conferred Monopoly Power on Nutriset? 
 
If Nutriset has monopoly power in its relevant market, a finding of violation of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act could potentially follow.112 The ‘284 patent would only 
confer monopoly power on Nutriset if there are no substitutable products.113 If the ‘284 
patent confers monopoly power on Nutriset, then Nutriset would also have to engage in 
monopoly conduct in order to violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.114 
 
The ‘284 patent has likely conferred monopoly power on Nutriset.115 When 
considering potential substitutable products, the specific advantages of Plumpy’Nut also 
have to be considered.116 The substitute would have to have a shelf life of two years 
without refrigeration, be fit for consumption without mixing with water, contain all of the 
vitamins and minerals necessary for a full day, and have a pleasant taste while 
maintaining a similar cost.117 There are currently no non-infringing products widely 
available for substitution.118 The 10% of the market share Nutriset does not own consists 
of RUTFs that have much shorter shelf lives, are substantially more expensive, or 
otherwise require supervision of a physician and multiple daily doses.119 For example, 
Meals-Ready-to-Eat (MRE), used by the American military, have a shelf life of three 
years.120 However, they are not nutritionally composed to be consumed for more than 
twenty-one days in a row, while a Plumpy’Nut cycle lasts for a period of over six 
months.121 Also, because of expensive packaging requirements, each MRE costs the U.S. 
government over $7, compared to just under $1 for each unit of Plumpy’Nut.122 Because 
there are no substitutable products that do not infringe the ‘284 patent, the patent has 
likely conferred monopoly power on Nutriset.123 
 
Monopoly power alone does not create a legal cause of action.124 The monopoly 
power must be in a relevant market, and monopoly conduct is required for a Sherman Act 
violation.125 Defining a relevant market is a critical step in analyzing a Sherman Act 
violation.126 Here, the market can be defined as the global market for RUTFs, of which 
Nutriset has a 90% market share.127 Therefore, Nutriset has monopoly power in a relevant 
                                                
112 See 15 U.S.C §2 (1890). 
113 See Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
114 See generally id. 
115 See id. 
116 Sanjay Gupta, The Funny Sounding Nut Paste That’s Saving Children’s Lives in Somalia, CNN (Aug. 
20, 2011), http://eatocracy.cnn.com/2011/08/10/plumpynut/. 
117 Id. 
118  CBSNews, A Life Saver Called “Plumpynut”, CBSNews (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/19/60minutes/main3386661.shtml. 
119 Id. 
120 British Broadcasting Corporation, US Army’s Hi-Tech, Two Year Old Sandwich Served Fresh, BBC 
(Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-15987343. 
121 Id. 
122 Rice, supra note 23, (2 September 2010). 
123 Id. 
124 15 U.S.C §2 (1890). 
125 Id. 
126 See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965). 
127 Rao, supra note 26, at 121. 
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market.128 In addition to monopoly power in a relevant market, monopoly conduct is 
required.129 Potential monopoly conduct could be the fact that Nutriset has refused to 
license its technology.130 However, Section 271(d)(4) of the Patent Act states that “no 
patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement . . . shall be denied relief or 
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of 
having…refused to license or use any rights to the patent.”131 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has interpreted this statute, holding that refusals to license 
a patent are per se lawful, as long as there is no illegal tying, fraud on the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office or sham litigation to enforce the patent.132 Refusal to license a patent, 
therefore, does not constitute monopoly conduct and does not immediately give rise to an 
antitrust violation.133 Accordingly, Nutriset’s behavior with the ‘284 patent likely does 
not violate the Sherman Act.134 
 
III.  TRIPS 
 
The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) is an international 
agreement developed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) that outlines legal 
standards that member nations are obligated to implement in their domestic legislation as 
a requirement of membership.135 The United States is a founding member of the WTO 
and an early signatory.136 TRIPS was drafted with the goal of creating intellectual 
property regulations that stress protection and exclusion rather than dissemination and 
competition, and the regulations apply to all intellectual property systems.137 However, 
one of the main objectives of TRIPS is to increase the flow of patented exports to 
developing nations that are signatories of the agreement. 138  This is because by 
guaranteeing the minimum level of intellectual property enforcement required 
domestically by TRIPS, developed nations would have less concern and increased 
incentive to provide these developing nations with patented products and technology.139 
 
In certain instances, TRIPS allows member nations to grant compulsory licenses 
for patented technology.140 In the Doha Declaration of 2001, these provisions of TRIPS 
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were reinforced.141 The Doha Declaration was adopted as part of TRIPS primarily to 
clarify the scope of the agreement and also to alleviate concerns of developing countries 
that feared the agreement was being interpreted narrowly.142 In the Doha Declaration, 
there are three paragraphs relevant to compulsory licensing of patented technology.143 
Specifically, these paragraphs indicate that TRIPS does not aim to prevent member states 
from taking measures to protect public health.144 Additionally, the paragraphs identify, 
under the category of public health, access to essential medicines by all people as a 
central goal of the Doha Declaration.145 In practice, the compulsory licensing provisions 
of the Doha Declaration have been principally applied to pharmaceuticals and, to a lesser 
extent, agriculture.146 However, the provisions have been abused by some member 
nations and have also been criticized as reducing the incentive to innovate.147 
 
A. USE OF THE COMPULSORY LICENSING PROVISIONS OF TRIPS 
 
Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration states that member states have the “right to 
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”148 
Paragraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration provides member states with the power to grant 
compulsory licenses and also to determine the grounds upon which the license is to be 
granted.149 Finally, Paragraph 5(c) limits the grant of compulsory licenses to situations of 
national emergency or extreme urgency, but allows each individual state to independently 
define the terms “national emergency” or “extreme urgency.”150 Accordingly, as the only 
category of patented technology to be specifically mentioned in the Doha Declaration, 
pharmaceuticals have been routinely subjected to compulsory licensing by member 
states.151 To a lesser degree, compulsory licenses for agricultural products or processes 
have also been issued by member states.152 
 
Pharmaceuticals are patentable in almost every individual member state of 
TRIPS.153 Pharmaceutical patents are important because they provide the primary form of 
intellectual property protection for the developer and are often the only way the 
developer can recover the sizable cost of development.154 Compulsory licensing of 
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pharmaceuticals can have a positive effect in a humanitarian perspective.155 By issuing a 
third party a compulsory license, a government can greatly reduce the cost of 
treatment. 156  For example, Malaysia issued compulsory licenses for three patented 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) drugs in 2003.157 As a result, the cost of 
AIDS treatment in the country was reduced 81%, reducing a monthly cost of $315 to 
$58.158 This reduced cost in turn allowed Malaysia to triple the number of patients treated 
for AIDS in government hospitals.159 Other developing countries, such as Indonesia, 
Zimbabwe, and South Africa have also seen similar results after issuing compulsory 
licenses.160 However, the use of compulsory licenses in developed countries has not 
produced equal results.161 
 
For example, Canada enacted a domestic statute entitled, “Canada’s Access to 
Medicines Regime (CAMR),” which aimed to implement the compulsory licensing 
provisions of the Doha Declaration.162 The statute aimed to create a system to export 
generic drugs to developing countries via a compulsory license, while balancing the 
commercial interests of the patent holder with broader humanitarian objectives. 163 
However, the statute as enacted created minimal practical benefit as it offered generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturers little incentive to produce medicines with a compulsory 
license.164 
 
As countries with significant generic pharmaceutical capabilities, Brazil and India 
have been among the most active WTO member states in issuing compulsory licenses for 
medicine.165 However, the practice in these countries has been to manufacture the drugs 
not for their domestic population, but to export them to other developing countries that 
may not have the production capabilities.166 Although this practice is technically legal 
under TRIPS, the practice has come under fire as an abuse of the compulsory licensing 
provision.167 The result of these practices is that the original manufacturer is unable to 
sell the drug at a competitive cost and is ultimately unable to recover the investment in 
developing the medicine.168 A tangential issue is that consumers of the drug in developed 
countries are expected to pay an even higher price for the drug, in order for the original 
manufacturer to combat the flooding of the market in developing countries with generic 
products.169 
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 A second area of patented technology that is subjected to compulsory licensing is 
agriculture, or biotechnology.170 However, the majority of biotechnology patents are not 
effective in geographic areas that require them the most.171 For example, genetically 
engineered seeds for corn or soybean that improve crop yield are of little benefit to 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, where neither the climate nor infrastructure permit the 
growth of corn or soybeans.172 Also, there is little incentive to innovate or design new 
biotechnology geared towards a geographic market where the farmers will not be able to 
provide compensation.173 As a business consideration, designing products for Sub-
Saharan Africa will not generally result in a high return on investment; the farmers in the 
area are by no means wealthy.174 Agricultural patents are not subjected to compulsory 
licensing as often as pharmaceuticals for another reason.175 In most cases, an agricultural 
product may be covered by many patents, creating a patent thicket.176 For example, in 
2000, a group of non-profit organizations attempted to free the technology used to grow 
vitamin-enriched rice.177 In order to do so, the group had to clear over seventy patents 
and licenses that were held by thirty-two organizations.178 
 
 Because food has a direct impact on public health, patented food products or 
processes also fall within the potential compulsory licensing provisions of TRIPS.179 
However, there are limited examples of compulsory licenses for patented foods being 
granted by member states.180 Part of the reason is that food patents are small in number, 
and when they exist, they cover novelty or special foods.181 For many developing 
countries, the desire or market for typical patented foods is slim, due to the fact that 
populations may not even have sufficient access to staple, unpatented foods. 182 
Additionally, granting a compulsory license for a patented food is generally not thought 
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B.  The Effect of Compulsory Licensing Under TRIPS on the Incentive to Innovate 
 
Intellectual property law is broadly premised on reward and incentive.184 The 
theory of granting intellectual property rights to an individual or entity implies the belief 
that reward for creativity is imperative to develop a cycle of continuous creativity and to 
increase the amount of valuable knowledge in the public domain.185 Striking a balance 
between the interests of an inventor or creator and the public domain is an ongoing 
consideration when considering intellectual property rights, and particularly patent 
law. 186 Within the patent context, an issued patent provides an inventor with the 
possibility of commercial success.187 Accordingly, subjecting a patent to a compulsory 
license seemingly divests the inventor of his or her intellectual property, as well as the 
potential for commercial success, and therefore directly affects an inventor’s incentive to 
innovate.188  
 
The ability for individual states to define when a national emergency or situation 
of extreme urgency occurs has led to instances of abuse of the TRIPS agreement.189 
Member states have full discretion over the amount of compensation to the patentee for a 
compulsory license, which creates an additional impact on the incentive to innovate.190 
Because of this broad power given to each independent state, there is a substantial 
discrepancy between the compensation awarded to the patentee.191 For example, some 
states use a hypothetical negotiation standard, while others provide only token 
compensation.192 
 
One example of a member state that has issued compulsory pharmaceutical 
licenses is Thailand.193 Considering the context of the Doha Declaration, the generally 
accepted intent of the compulsory licensing provisions was to allow the compulsory 
licensing of medicines that treated infectious diseases, as these diseases were rampant in 
developing countries and generally led to death.194 However, the plain language of the 
agreement includes all medicines.195 Some member states have utilized this fact to their 
advantage and have been criticized as abusing the provision.196 For example, Thailand 
has consistently issued compulsory licenses for medicines treating non-infectious 
conditions, such as heart disease and cancer.197 For the purposes of TRIPS, Thailand is 
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considered a middle-income country, drawing further ire from other member states.198 
Finally, in granting compulsory licenses, Thailand has instituted a practice of issuing the 
license with little prior warning and at a royalty rate of less than one percent of the total 
sale price.199 This rate, at times only one-half percent, is generally calculated on a sale 
price far below the market price at which the generic is sold, effectively destroying the 
market for the original product.200 
 
 From an economic perspective, compulsory licensing in a field as lucrative as 
pharmaceuticals can encourage manufacturers to adopt a wait-and-see approach rather 
than focusing on developing new drugs.201 By eliminating the research and development 
costs of new drugs, manufacturers can wait until a drug is discovered and patented by 
another party and further wait and see if the drug is a commercial success.202 If so, the 
manufacturer can subsequently begin mass production of the drug while relying on a 
compulsory license from the patentee.203 Creating a clearly defined category of products 
or other patented technology that may be subject to a compulsory license can combat 
this.204 By providing this information in a clear manner, inventors will be aware of the 
potential subjection to a compulsory license before they even obtain the patent.205 A 
bright line standard is essential, however, to prevent this from becoming a tool of bad 
faith for generic manufacturers that simply want to engage in the inventor’s business.206 
 
IV.  REAPPLICATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL COMPULSORY LICENSING TO 
PLUMPY’NUT 
 
Antitrust law is not a solution to the Plumpy’Nut problem because antitrust law 
has not proven effective in cases where there is failure to license by a patentee.207 
Additionally, it is unlikely that Nutriset has violated any of the antitrust laws in the 
U.S.208 The issued ‘284 patent, although broad, is likely valid and enforceable, so 
Nutriset is under no obligation to license the technology to any party.209 
 
TRIPS already includes a broad framework for when compulsory licensing is 
acceptable.210 Although food falls within the realm of the safeguarding public interest 
provision of TRIPS, its practical application has been limited primarily to agriculture, and 
even then, the provision has been underutilized.211 As a signatory to the WTO, the United 
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States is bound by TRIPS. 212  Accordingly, any domestic legislation involving 
compulsory licensing of patents must fall within the guidelines set forth in the Doha 
Declaration.213 
 
The Plumpy’Nut patent is analogous to a pharmaceutical patent.214 Traditionally, 
patents are thought to cover whole products, and lost profits or reasonable royalties 
measure damages.215 With the rapid advancement of technology, these types of patents 
have become the exception rather than the rule.216 For example, a handheld device such 
as the Apple iPhone is covered by over 120 patents, with each individual component 
potentially covered by several patents.217 These patents, covering a small invention that is 
part of a larger product, have value essentially only as licensing tools because they are 
not commercially useful independently.218 However, one area of technology where the 
patent usually covers the entire product is pharmaceuticals.219 The entire compound is 
covered in one patent, and the compound can be sold in product form.220 In this regard, 
the Plumpy’Nut patent is like a pharmaceutical patent.221 The patent discloses a formula 
that can be readily sold as a product, and a single patent covers the entire invention.222 
Accordingly, provisions of TRIPS applying to pharmaceutical law should readily be 
applied to food products such as Plumpy’Nut.223 
 
In reapplying these principles to food products such as Plumpy’Nut, some of the 
considerations that have affected the use of compulsory licensing in regards to 
pharmaceuticals should be avoided.224 For example, the scope of legislation allowing 
compulsory licenses should be narrowly defined to avoid the pitfall of pharmaceutical 
compulsory licensing, in which any patented product is eligible.225 Also, the definition of 
an eligible product should be defined rather than leaving it open to interpretation by 
member states or countries.226 Such a limitation would reduce the potential for abuse that 
occurs within the pharmaceutical field.227 Also, remuneration should be addressed in a 
clear manner, eliminating the possibility of token compensation.228 While undertaking 
these considerations, however, they cannot be so restrictive as to create a lengthy 
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bureaucratic process when an unforeseen emergency arises.229 A structure that considers 
these factors may encourage voluntary licensing because the licensor will be aware that a 
potential licensee has the option of a compulsory license.230 In creating a scheme to 
reapply these principles, both policy goals and practical issues should be considered. 
 
A.  Policy Considerations of Reapplication 
 
In crafting legislation to allow compulsory licensing of a patent for the benefit of 
a non-domestic population, there are several factors that should be considered. First, the 
breadth of the patent must be considered.231 If a patent is overly broad, this factor should 
weigh in favor of a compulsory license.232 If not, then this factor should weigh against 
compulsory license due to the fact that potential licensees can design around the patent or 
otherwise innovate a different solution. 233  To determine if a patent is broad, the 
availability of substitutes should be considered.234 
 
A second policy consideration is that the incentive or reward associated with 
patents should remain intact.235 The original inventor is entitled to the rights to his or her 
invention and should be compensated accordingly.236 To do otherwise will reduce the 
incentive to innovate and potentially stymie the innovation that patent law seeks to 
drive.237 This can be achieved by creating a clear and brightline standard for patents that 
can potentially be subject to compulsory licensing.238 Rather than a broad category that is 
open to differing interpretation, such as the public interest umbrella in TRIPS, a concise 
definition of categories of patents and instances in which they will be subject to 
compulsory licensing will allow an inventor to realize this before investing in research.239 
Although this may limit innovation in these specific areas, a balance must be struck 
between the needs of this statute and the policy goals of patent law.240 Plumpy’Nut is a 
narrow scenario in which there is a single primary producer and that producer refuses to 
license the patent, where the patent covers a technology vital to resolving a humanitarian 
crisis.241 Another way in which this policy can be achieved is by temporarily suspending 
the patent during the term of the compulsory license and then adding the length of the 
term to the expiration date when the compulsory license expires.242 In the Plumpy’Nut 
case, the ‘284 patent expires in 2017, leaving a relatively short length of time for Nutriset 
                                                
229 See id. 
230 See id. 
231 See Rao, supra note 26. at 118. 
232 Schmeider, supra note 94, at 183. 
233 Feldman, supra note 70, at 434. 
234 Image Tech. Servs., 125 F.3d at 1207. 
235 Ho, supra note 156, at 379. 
236 Id. 
237 See Thomas F. Cotter, Market Fundamentalism and the TRIPS Agreement, 22 CARDOZO ART & ENT. 
L.J. 307, 323-324 (2004). 
238 See id. 
239 See id. 
240 Ho, supra note 156, at 377. 
241 Rao, supra note 26, at 113. 
242 Michael Ilg, Market Competition in Aid of Humanitarian Concern: Reconsidering Pharmaceutical Drug 
Patents, 9 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 149, 151 (2010). 
CHICAGO – KENT COLLEGE OF LAW 
11 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 238 
256 
to profit on their invention.243 Because between 80-90% of patents never create any 
monetary return, Nutriset should be adequately compensated for their efforts and 
innovation.244 
 
Enforcing patent rights should not be discouraged either.245 However, in an 
instance where a patent falls within the considerations of the proposed legislation, and the 
patentee fails to license or negotiate in good faith, this provision should apply.246 The 
global actions of the patentee should also be considered.247 For example, Nutriset owns 
patents in some of countries where demand is highest, such as in Chad, Congo, Sudan, 
Uganda, and Zimbabwe, creating a situation where no competitors can enter the 
market.248  Nutriset’s past litigation history also shows threats to enforce rights in 
countries of transit and storage.249 
 
Compulsory licensing has been used in the U.S. in the past, and the policy reasons 
for allowing such use are also applicable in the instant situation.250 In copyright law, 
compulsory licensing is allowed to balance the interests of authors and the public and to 
ensure compensation to the author.251 Similarly, here, a compulsory license will balance 
the needs of a developing country while ensuring the patentee is compensated. Likewise, 
compulsory licensing for patents is not a new consideration.252 Compulsory licenses are 
allowed for the benefit of the American public for non-life threatening situations, 
accordingly, a logical step implies that a compulsory license should be allowed for a life 
threatening situation in a developing country.253 
 
Why should we, as Americans, care about non-domestic populations? In addition 
to moral obligations, because a starving population is most likely not going to be able to 
provide for itself, let alone manufacture a generic product.254 Even if they have the 
facilities, obtaining the raw materials can create delays and be prohibitively expensive.255 
Thus there is a need to allow the manufacture in developed countries that have adequate 
resources.256 
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B.  Practical Aspects of Reapplication 
 
A compulsory license would potentially reduce security in the investment of 
developing new technology, as well as reduce the incentive to innovate.257 A side effect 
may also be the creation of a market in which parties rely on compulsory licenses rather 
than innovating. 258  Regardless, in some specifically defined instances, a carefully 
distributed compulsory license will save lives and minimize any negative side effects.259 
In the Plumpy’Nut instance, granting a compulsory license to a third party to create and 
distribute a fixed volume of infringing product, as defined by currently outstanding 
orders placed by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), for a specifically defined 
humanitarian cause, with a provision for payment to the patentee meeting certain 
guidelines, will be an ideal solution. 
 
By considering orders for products placed by NGOs as opposed to states, the 
incentive for a state to overestimate its own needs and resell remaining product will be 
eliminated.260 Additionally, instituting an efficient procedure for issuing a compulsory 
license will allow for a timely response to a humanitarian crisis and further avoid a 
bureaucratic quagmire.261 A problem unique to the RUTF industry is that demand is 
unpredictable and comes in surges.262 Accordingly, although RUTFs potentially have a 
lengthy shelf life, a large reserve of supply may not be practical.263 For most purposes, 
the amount of RUTFs needed and the length of a humanitarian crisis are unforeseeable.264 
Accordingly, any compulsory licensing statute or regulation will have to allow relief as 
soon as possible.265 
 
Also, the costs of the generic producer should also be considered.266 Generic 
manufacturers costs include production, transaction, royalty, regulatory approval and 
quality assurance costs.267 There should remain incentive for generic manufacturers to 
produce generics or else the compulsory license will be ineffective in reaching its 
goals.268 The compulsory licensing regulation also should be couched in ex ante terms to 
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prevent an unwitting generic manufacturer from being held liable for patent infringement 
and potentially willful infringement.269 
 
The compensation due to a party forced to grant a compulsory license 
compensation must be less than what their current profit margin is on the product, in 
order to avoid a situation in which the licensor will have an incentive to produce as little 
product as possible while relying on the generic manufacturer for “free” profit.270 This 
will avoid an outcome like the current situation in Thailand.271 Licensors should not be 
deterred from increasing their own production capacity.272 One additional consideration 
is required negotiating between a licensor and licensee before issuing a compulsory 
license.273 Prior negotiation is required by TRIPS but is undefined.274 By creating 
guidelines to ensure good faith negotiation, an independent agreement may be reached 
between the parties.275 A compulsory license may even act as a deterrent to bad faith 
negotiating, because both parties know that a compulsory license is an option.276 
 
Any legislation must be simple, practical, predictable, and enforceable.277 By 
limiting compulsory licensing for the amount of outstanding orders placed that cannot be 
fulfilled, the licensor retains an incentive to innovate while the humanitarian crisis 
receives critical assistance.278 Finally, the terms “emergency” and “urgency” should be 
statutorily defined, to assist in the application of any compulsory licensing negotiations 




By adopting a statute within these guidelines, the typical black market and free 
rider problems will not exist. Because the patents falling under its purview will be geared 
primarily towards developing countries, there will be little or no demand for the products 
manufactured via a compulsory license. In terms of the free rider problem, once again, 
the eligible patents will deal with industries and populations where there is little 
innovation or research and development to begin with, and the terms of the compulsory 
license will not allow a generic manufacturer to collect a windfall, thereby eliminating 
the incentive to free ride. 
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By making clear what categories of patents can be covered by the provision, 
inventors can plan for a statutory license if they cannot meet the production, and they will 
have a fixed royalty rate by which to calculate potential profit. Using this data, they can 
gauge how much they would like to invest in the research of a new invention. Although 
this may seem to disincentivize innovation in these fields, a guaranteed royalty serves as 
consolation. 
 
Under the proposed statutory considerations, the Plumpy’Nut problem would be 
solved. After being informed that Nutriset, the single producer of Plumpy’Nut, would not 
be able to fulfill its order in a timely manner, an NGO would file a report with an 
advisory committee. The advisory committee would then contact Nutriset directly and 
request a license on behalf of interested generic manufacturers in America. Nutriset 
would be given the opportunity to negotiate individual licenses with each of the parties 
for a reasonable period of time, given the severity of the humanitarian crisis. Were either 
of the parties to negotiate in bad faith, or otherwise be unable to come to an agreement, 
the US government would then issue a compulsory non-exclusive license to the interested 
manufacturers and could temporarily suspend the patent. This license would be limited in 
scope and duration, with the scope being for the identical product to be used specifically 
for the humanitarian crisis, and the duration being for a specific number of units. For 
example, if Nutriset was unable to fulfill an order of 25,000 tons of Plumpy’Nut, the 
compulsory license would equal that amount. Given the unpredictable nature and 
unpredictable time frames of humanitarian crises, this approach seemingly becomes 
cumbersome, however, the government is free to issue continuous limited licenses. As 
one expires, if there are additional outstanding orders, another license can be issued. If at 
any point during the compulsory license timeframe Nutriset is able to accommodate the 
new orders, the licensing would stop and the amount of time that had passed from the 
date the license was issued would be added to the expiration date of the patent. 
 
For a treatable and solvable condition, such as world hunger, compulsory 
licensing should be allowed. The Plumpy’Nut problem blends issues of intellectual 
property law with economic, political, and moral considerations in which the inventor is 
trapped between a rock and a hard place, and this legislation will assist all parties 
involved. 
 
 
